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II. Introduction 
 After World War II, Albania retreated into a dictatorship based on Marxism-Leninism 
that ruled through persecutions and silencing opposition, thus severely limiting civil society. In 
1990, the authoritarian communist regime in Albania fell as Albania began transitioning into a 
democracy during what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave” of democratic transitions.1 
Since its isolation and autarky, Albania has improved relations with its neighboring countries, 
joined NATO, and signed the Stabilization and Association Pact with the European Union in an 
effort to rejoin the international community as a democracy. However, despite improvements in 
democratic governance, Albania faces a rough transition to democracy due to a lack of 
democratic political culture. In the 2010 Democracy Index of 165 countries, Albania ranked 84th 
with a score of 5.86 out of 10. With the exceptions of Russia and Bosnia, Albania is the only 
Eastern European country categorized as a hybrid regime instead of a flawed democracy, thus 
ranking below its neighbors.2 Furthermore, while Albania has re-entered the arena of 
international relations, its citizens have yet to strongly exhibit values of global citizenship that 
are necessary for taking action in issues of global importance today.  Albanian democracy faces 
low levels of civic engagement, as well as low levels of rule of law due to corruption and weak 
capacity of state institutions.3 
Civil society in Albania has risen to meet the challenges of the emerging democracy in a 
new global context with an emerging international framework of values. After 1990 civil society 
organizations (CSO) first formed, focusing on issues of human rights, humanitarian aid, and 
good governance. But the effects and remnants of the communist past in Albanian society and 
politics impede its work in democratization and citizens’ engagement with global issues. While it 
has had some successes, Albanian civil society post-1990 has been mostly ineffective in helping 
Albania to democratize because its internal structure and external environment is influenced by 
the Communist legacy. 
 
 
III. Theory and Literature Review  
 
Democracy, Civil Society, and Trust 
A democracy is a form of government where the governed rule directly or through 
elected representatives. Theorists like Locke and Rousseau base the emergence of democracy on 
the “Social Contract;” a group of people come together to form a government by consenting to 
its rule and to each individual’s responsibility in said government.4 5 Rule of law in a state and in 
global governance is defined by states’, institutions’, and citizens’ open and fair adherence to 
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justice, with accountability according to set standards and laws.6 A democracy has checks and 
balances in which different government branches exercise oversight of one another and prevent 
abuse. Checks, pluralism of interests, and political actors characterize a free democracy. In a 
democracy, citizens have civil liberties and rights that are immune to government intrusion. 
One theory about how democratization can come about is the political approach. This 
states that democracy can be achieved if actors like political parties, politicians, and local or 
international civil society organizations press for democratization. The premise of civil society 
leading to democratization follows this approach.7 
The engagement of citizens is essential to a democracy and to global citizenship because 
democracy and international governance require the input of the governed in decision-making. 
Jean Louis Cohen says, “Civil society as the sources of influence and control of representative 
political institutions is the heart of a liberal democracy.”8 Citizens act collectively to positively 
influence their local or international community through civic engagement.9 Citizens’ actions 
and the associations that they form, independently of government, constitute the civil society of a 
country. Out of the experience of individuals, government, and civil society, there develops a 
certain political culture, a system of “values and beliefs about government.” 10  
The idea of civil society has become an indispensable feature of Western democratic 
identity.11 Major thinkers contributing to the modern idea of civil society are Alexis de 
Tocqueville, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Robert Putnam. 
Tocqueville admired civil society in the United States as the vast volunteer associations that dealt 
with civil and political life.12 13 Some sources limit the definition of civil society to formal 
institutions like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). 
This paper uses a broader definition of civil society, encompassing all collective actions by 
citizens in the public sphere with the aim of improving their national and international 
community; religion, culture, activism, literature, academia, and art are all part of civil society.   
Mainstream theorists from Tocqueville to Putnam believe that civil society fosters trust, 
which builds peaceful and stable relations necessary for cooperation in a democracy  with global 
humanitarian values. Hardin defines trust as a person’s belief that others will not harm him on 
purpose, and that people may act in the interest of others.14 Voluntary organizations teach trust, 
tolerance, and appreciation for diversity by bringing together people of different background, 
elements that are all essential in global citizenship. Putnam’s Social Capital Theory states that 
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voluntary and citizen associations and organizations are crucial in democracy because they create 
trust, social bonds, and solidarity between citizens.15 Trust is also necessary for people to have 
good relations with their government and view it as legitimate. How much trust individuals have 
in their government indicates how well the government is performing according to the people.16 
 
 
Relationship Between Civil Society and Democracy  
Mainstream theorists believe that a healthy civil society leads to democratization. As 
Karatnycky writes, “It is the third sector of civic nongovernmental life that can create an 
atmosphere that ensures the healthy functioning of state institutions, combats corruption, protects 
respect of the rule of law, and acts as a defender of free media.”17 Scholars like Putnam and 
Tocqueville say that through civil society, citizens learn skills, knowledge, and values of 
democratic practices, and bring such values to government.18 Citizens then utilize these same 
values in advocacy for transnational issues and engagement with institutions of global 
governance. For example, such is the case when CSOs consult with major intergovernmental 
organizations like the United Nations. Traditionally, civil society teaches and reinforces values 
necessary to democracy and global citizenship like reciprocity, solidarity, cooperation, and 
appreciation for cultures and diversity.19  
Local, national, and international civil society acts as a balanced opposition to states in 
favor of society. It provides a venue for people to develop ideas, agendas, and deliberate, thus 
facilitating dialogue in governance, which is a main feature of democracy.  Furthermore, CSOs 
speak for groups of citizens, representing different sectors of society. Thus, civil society fosters 
plurality, which is a necessity in democracy and in global deliberations which must represent the 
diverse voices of many. Civil society is a mediator between the state and society by transmitting 
interests and demands of the population to the state and to global governance institutions.20 
Finally, civil society plays a “disciplinary role” for the state by forcing it to adhere to 
public morality and standards of the population, eliciting accountability. According to Putnam, 
the state must have autonomous institutions to check its power, and civil society provides these 
institutions.21 This is especially true regarding CSOs’ role in fighting government corruption 
through tools like corruption perception indexes, anti-corruption public awareness campaigns, 
and education.22  
There is very high correlation between civil society, democratization, and global 
citizenry, but Sardamov and Green caution that civil society may not necessarily be pro-
                                                          
15
 Ibid., 206. 
16
 Newton, “Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy,” 205. 
17
 Adrian Karatnycky, "Making Democratization Work: Overcoming the Challenges of Political 
Transitions," Harvard International Review 24.2 (2002): 54, accessed January 4, 2014, Academic Search Premier, 
EBSCOhost. 
18
 Eric Uslaner and Gabriel Badescu, Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy (London: Routledge, 
2003), 59, 125. http://fairfield.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=182240.   
19
 Newton, “Trust social capital, civil society, and democracy,” 4. 
20
 Nevila Xhindi, “The Complex Relationship Between Government and Civil Society in Albania (Twenty 
Years in Focus: From 1990 till 2010). European Scientific Journal 9.17 (2013): 69-70, accessed October 20, 2013, 
http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/1158/1174. 
21
 Uslaner and Badescu, editors, Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, 56. 
22
 Lejla Sadiku, “Civil society and anti-corruption: experiences from Albania, Kosovo and Serbia,” 
Romanian Journal of Political Science 10.1 (2010): 34. http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-
321056573/civil-society-and-anti-corruption-experiences-from  
3
Kovaci: Democracy in Albania
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2014
democracy, or even capture the diversity of their society.23 24 Nevertheless, this does not refute 
the mainstream theory that if it has democratic principles at the core, civil society should lead to 
democratization and foster global citizenship.   
 
 
Global Citizenship, Democratic Value, and Good Governance  
Global citizenship carries characteristics similar to those of democratic societies: a sense 
of community, pluralism, appreciation for diversity (especially multicultural), civic engagement, 
and advocacy among others. A global citizen identifies himself or herself with a new emerging 
“global community” in addition to the local community.25 Such a global community has a set of 
values, beliefs, and practices, often informed by those of mature democracies. It has emerged 
through globalization and an increase in communication, transportation, and travel, as people 
feel more connected with the world and different populations, regardless of geography.26 Like a 
national democracy, global citizenship assumes an awareness and sense of responsibility to 
issues and people, including those in different areas of the world. Both democracy and global 
citizenship are associated with advocacy in national and world issues. As such, civic engagement 
and civil society are essential to taking action for international causes and to finding global 
solutions for such issues. In fact, some argue for the emergence of an international civil society. 
Much like with traditional western democracy models, global citizenship supports rule of law, 
human rights, tolerance for religious and cultural diversity, gender equality, participation and 
civic engagement, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, good governance, and 
humanitarianism among other causes.27 28 
A new philosophy of education, global citizenship education aims to promote such values 
as peace, human rights, respect for diversity, and justice.29 An example of this global citizenship 
education is the Secretary General’s Education First Initiative. In purpose and scope, it is similar 
to the “Democratic Citizenship Education” model proposed by Theodore Kaltsounis, and to the 
“Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights” of the Council of Europe.30 Such 
initiatives aim to teach values and philosophies that would enable people to operate within their 
national political system and beyond using ideals of human rights, democracy, non-violence, and 
peace.  
Among the many global issues of interest to global citizens, democracy and good 
governance have become increasingly important causes. This is evident when examining the 
numerous democratic transition efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. In fact, 
“democratic governance and peaceful societies” appears a priority to global citizens, as attested 
                                                          
23
 Sardamov, "‘Civil Society’ and the Limits of Democratic Assistance," 401. 
24
 Andrew T. Green, "Comparative Development of Post-communist Civil Societies." Europe-Asia Studies 
54.3 (2002): 467, doi: 10.1080/09668130220129560, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.  
25
 Israel, C. Ronal. “What Does it mean to be a Global Citizen?” Kosmos: Journal for Global 
Transformation. Summer 2012. http://www.kosmosjournal.org/article/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-global-citizen/.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid. 
28
 United Nations Global Education First Initiative. “Priority #3: Foster Global Citizenship.” 2014. 
http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/220.htm.  
29
 Oxfam. “Global Citizenship.” 2014. http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education/global-citizenship 
30
 Council of Europe. “Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights. 2014 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/edc/default_en.asp. 
4
Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss1/2
to by the UN’s Post-2015 Development Framework and the World We Want Survey.31  As of 
September 2014, this survey showed that “an honest and responsive government” ranks fourth 
out of 16 top priorities voted on by over 5 million people from around the world.32  Additionally, 
several international NGOs such as Freedom House and CIVICUS focus on meeting civil society 
demands for good governance by supporting democratic governance in different countries and 
areas. The case of democratic transitions in Albania, in Easter Europe, and in other parts of the 
world fits into this context.  
 Movements to mainstream democratic and global citizenship values developed in the 
western world as a result of historical events, conflicts, and world leaders. This was especially so 
after World War Two with the emergence of international organizations and civil society. 
However, Eastern European populations did not experience the rise in global citizenry, as the 
iron curtain prevented them from doing so by discouraging democratic ideals and contact with 
the Western word. Global citizenship relies on awareness and information of international issues 
so that people may act in the global sphere. This phenomenon of international engagement was 
discouraged, stifled, and in some cases like  Albania, it was outlawed under the totalitarian 
Communist regimes.   
 
 
Authoritarianism and Democratization in Eastern Europe 
 Up until 1990, Eastern European countries had authoritarian regimes whose legacies 
today make democratization and active global citizenship engagement difficult. In an 
authoritarian government, the state determines rule of law, and there are few if any checks and 
balances.33 For instance, Soviet communist regimes ruled arbitrarily through persecuting 
opposition. Scholars and populations of Eastern Europe believed civil society to be key in 
overthrowing dictatorships and establishing democracies in the region.34 After the Eastern 
European dictatorships fell, the challenge that Albania and other Eastern European countries face 
today is democratization. 
Albania in particular has struggled the most with the transition to democracy because of 
its exceptionally harsh dictatorship. There is a consensus among Eastern European scholars that 
Albania is a unique case within Eastern Europe as it had one of the fiercest authoritarian regimes, 
the highest level of isolation from the world, and the most loyal regime to the ideologies and 
methods of Stalin.35 In fact, journalists, scholars, and laypeople like bloggers often make the 
comparison between Albania and North Korea because of their isolation from other countries, 
silencing of opposition, and feelings of near-worship towards their respective party leaders.36 
Despite local and international civil society efforts, Albania’s communist history continues to 
hinder its transition to democracy today.  
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IV. Historical Background 
 
Repression in Communist Albania 
Like other Eastern European countries, after World War II Albania adopted a communist 
dictatorship. The People’s Socialist Republic of Albania rose in 1946, headed by Enver Hoxha. 
Albania had arguably the most ruthless, Stalinist regime out of the Eastern European states, 
perhaps with the exception of Ceausescu’s Romania.37 38 39 It had the highest percentage of 
executions, imprisonment, and political exile than any other Eastern European country.40 The 
state maintained control through the military, a robust omnipresent secret police (Sigurimi), and 
a general reign of terror that eliminated opposition.41 The ruling party officially sentenced an 
estimated 6,500 people to execution. In a population of three million people, the Communist 
party imprisoned, internally-exiled, and executed about 100,000 people42 compared to 
Czechoslovakia’s 65,000; Hungary’s 27,000; Poland’s 22,000.43 44 Through collective 
punishment, an entire family could be internally exiled or imprisoned if one family member was 
judged to be against the government. Another estimate states that 200,000 Albanians were in 
prison camps at some point in their lives.45  
In the 1960s, Hoxha pursued his own version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution by 
severing contact with the West and other countries, closing down religious institutions, 
destroying mosques and churches, and imprisoning and executing religious leaders, as well as 
intellectuals in order to instill the communist values and mindset into the entire population.46 At 
the end of the Cultural and Ideological Revolution, Hoxha declared Albania to be the world’s 
first atheist country. Albanian communism outlawed religion and the traditional Code of Leke 
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Dukagji.47 It persecuted Albanian tribe leaders in an attempt to rid the country of what it called 
barbarism of tribes and clans.48 The regime instituted a strict ban on private property and forced 
collective land work. It propagandized against other countries, peoples, cultures, and societies, 
especially western nations like the US.  
While other regimes in Eastern Europe were opening up after the 1970s, Hoxha pursued 
an isolationist policy and tightened control of Albanians. The country cut off relations with 
Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China after accusing them of betraying the ideals of Marxism-
Leninism. Albania’s isolationist ideology, “Hoxhaism,” 49 became increasingly totalitarian. 
Exiting or entering the country was illegal, making international contact nearly impossible for 
Albanian citizens. By the late 1980s, Albania was experiencing mass deterioration in standards 
of living as a result of its attempted autarky. With worse resource shortages than Romania, 
Albanians were pushed to survival limits until the regime fell.50  
At the same time, the methods of silencing opposition during Socialism threatened any 
notion of civil society, especially global civil society. The government banned any contact with 
the international world, including listening to foreign music, radio, or watching foreign 
television. It attempted to construct a strict “Albanian” Communist identity. The government’s 
formula for eliminating opposition through “state terror” created a “unique communist mentality 
in Albania” that thwarted organized resistance like through CSOs.51 By law, formal 
institutionalized group association was a criminal act, and those who engaged in it were 
imprisoned. This is partly why formal civil society opposition movements like Solidarity and 
Charter 77 rose in other Eastern Europe states but not in Albania. About one third of Albanians 
experienced secret police harassment or were in labor camps.52 A history of fear and threat by 
the regime made open and collective dissention via civil society virtually impossible. In addition, 
the government created its own associations to squash independent civil society, such as through 
forced volunteering. It used professional and vocational schools to inculcate obedience and the 
Communist values (against a bourgeois culture) into the people.53  
 Nevertheless, some form of civil society activity continued to barely survive in the 
private sphere as citizens retreated from the public sphere. As McFadden says, civil society 
survived in Stalinist regimes despite totalitarianism because rulers never quite succeeded in 
extinguishing it.54 Civil society acted through literature, culture, and hidden religion. Writers and 
poets, like Ismail Kadare,55continued to express some free thinking using allegories and 
concealed meanings. In the home, some Albanians practiced religion and listened to western 
radio in secret against the law.56 
Fall of the Communist Regime and Transition to Democracy 
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Albania was the last country to exit the totalitarian system, and in 1991 it opened up to 
democracy with overwhelming support from Albanians.  Ramiz Alia succeeded Hoxha in 1985 
and relaxed rules for travel, contact with other countries, and free association. Contact with 
different countries became permissible. Due to internal pressure, in 1990 Alia established a 
multi-party system for the first time, thus opposition could finally organize. Albanians, inspired 
by the international events in the countries and societies around them, harnessed the values of 
democracy and acted upon them. After seeing the surrounding totalitarian governments fall 
around them, students and masses in Albania began demonstrations against their own regime.  
Law and order broke down, and agencies could no longer contain the protesters or destruction of 
state property. By 1990, there was mass economic breakdown: food rations and bread lines. 
Mass exodus occurred as Albanians crossed over to Greece and Italy.57 
In 1991, the remnant of the Albanian state called for an election. The Labor Party, later 
named Socialist Party, led by Fatos Nano won through manipulation. But demonstrations, riots 
and economic breakdown forced it to resign. Protests began in the north, a traditionally 
anticommunist area, and spread to the capital, Tirana. Fatos Nano’s government fell and the first 
democratic government in Albania came into being during the “Third Wave” of democracies in 
the world. 
In March 1992, the Democratic Party won elections. While the new government worked 
to establish order, there was still a lack of rule of law while lootings and destruction of 
infrastructure continued. As structural adjustment policies of the IMF and international economic 
institutions prescribed, Albania immediately underwent a rapid transformation through 
decentralization and neoliberalism to distance itself as far as possible from its prior command-
control economy. Privatization was accompanied by corruption and little media or public 
scrutiny.58 Global financial institutions promoting capitalism and liberal economics hailed 
“shock therapy” in Albania and pointed to its high GDP growth. However, international actors 
failed to recognize dangerous trends behind this deregulation: high unemployment, a remittance 
rate of over 20 percent fueling the GDP, uncontrolled migration, alienation of societal groups, 
organized international crime and corruption.59 According to Kajsiu, this rapid privatization and 
deregulation was the price that people were willing to pay to shake off the communist past.60 
Despite warnings, global actors were shocked when Albania almost disintegrated into civil war 
in 1997.  
In the Pyramid Scheme of 1997, about two thirds of Albanians invested money and life 
savings into the private embezzled investment scheme in order to gain wealth. When the pyramid 
collapsed, Albanians lost $1.2 billion in US dollars in total.61  People reacted in violent uprisings 
against the state, which they believe to be associated with the scam. As the state was fast 
collapsing and gangs took over cities, Berisha declared a state of emergency. About 2,000 people 
were killed during this conflict.62 The UN Security Council sent foreign forces to restore order in 
Albania and monitor elections in 1997. 
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The 1997 emergency elections brought into power the Socialist Party, which continued 
neoliberal reforms. Despite the catastrophe of mass deregulation, people still favored a liberal 
economy in order to transition away from the Communist legacy of state controlled economy. 
The 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis brought further strain on the weak Albanian economy as over 
400,000 Kosovar refugees sought refuge in Albania.63 This crisis placed a focus on the values of 
humanitarianism, as well as peace and conflict among Albanians. While winning Albania 
acclaim for its welcome of the refugees, the crisis exacerbated Albania’s economic troubles. 
Throughout all these developments, institutionalized Albanian and international civil society 
organizations rose for the first time and are now charged with the task of alleviating the above 
struggles, as well as with transforming Albania into a strong democracy with an informed and 
active global citizenry.  
 
 
Rise of Civil Society  
In the early 1990s, the fall of neighboring communist regimes incited Albanian students, 
human rights groups, and some previous communists against the old regime. Protests in Albania 
were anarchic rather than organized because the Secret Police was still active. Some scholars and 
journalists make the case that Albanian communism fell, not because of authentic grassroots 
movements which had been brewing for decades like in the more liberal Eastern European states, 
but because Albanians became aware of the fall of all other dictatorships around them and faced 
the worst economic degradation in Europe. This is similar to the domino fall of authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East in 2011, fueled by an international civil society that called upon the 
ideals of freedom, and democracy. Once protests began, the government could no longer 
preserve itself.64 In 1991, protesters effectively forced the newly “elected” Socialist Party to 
resign. Civil society was finally being revived through mass protests, and, for the first time, 
through rising formal associations.  
After 1990, hundreds of NGOs and civil society groups opened up in Albania, largely due 
to the influence of international CSOs. During the decentralization period, the state withdrew and 
could not address human rights abuses, violence against women, trafficking, and other issues. 
Therefore civil society organizations formed to fill the void. 65 66 Meanwhile international CSOs 
moved into Albania to address the humanitarian crises, such as those involving refugees. They 
first worked with human rights and social issues like women and children’s rights, illiteracy, 
poverty, and health care. 
Throughout the early to mid-1990s, the relationship between government and civil 
society was very weak. Civil society actors hesitated to work with the state because of its hostile 
attitude towards independent journalists, the press, and opposition. The legal status of CSOs in 
Albania improved as the government passed laws legitimizing and supporting their existence. 
For instance, the Civil Code of 1994 further improved the legal basis for NGOs, but prevented 
them from engaging in economic activities, hindering them economically.67  
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From 1997-2005 civil society in Albania grew significantly in mission, scope, funding, 
and visibility with foreign aid and support from the US and other western countries. Hundreds of 
NGOs registered with the state, many of them international. In 1997, NGOs supported by 
international donors focused on emergency aid and relief. Afterwards, they began to train 
political figures and civil society leaders in democracy. One large project that taught democratic 
citizenship education was Kaltsounis’s Democratic Education Project, a partnership between 
USAID, University of Washington, the Albanian Ministry of Education, Albanian universities, 
and the George Soros Foundation. CSOs began forming coalitions and partnering more 
frequently with government on legislation.  
  
Figure 1: Mapping Albanian Civil Society  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(CIVICUS 2010, 11) 
 
From 2002-2005, with the influence of international agencies, CSOs in Albania worked 
to improve governance via political development. For instance, civil society assumed the role of 
monitoring elections. NGOs worked with the government to initiate the 2001 Albanian Coalition 
against Corruption Plan on Anti-Corruption Awareness.68 Awareness of NGOs which help to 
progress democracy and good governance, have increased over the past few years.69 Such CSOs 
include the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) and Mjaft!, a youth-led NGO that 
tackles political and social  problems in Albania. 
In the mid to late 2000s, the Albanian government and civil society collaborated 
somewhat more on policy. Parliament consulted with civil society, private sector leaders, trade 
unions, and academics to formulate the 2007 National Strategy for Development and Integration. 
In 2009, government established the Civil Society Support Fund (CSSA) to encourage 
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development of civil society, although funding is perpetually low.70 Civil society helped form the 
Social Inclusion Strategy in 2008 to make social inclusion a high priority in Albania.71 
 
 
V. Weak Democracy and Low Civil Society Impact in Democratization  
 
Figure 2: Key Indicators of Albanian Democracy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(CIVICUS 2011, 164) 
 
Now open and even welcoming to internationalism, Albanians strongly support 
democracy, and Albania has made efforts to transition to a democracy with the help of 
international actors. In less than 25 years, Albania managed to transform from the most 
repressive totalitarian system to a partly free democracy with an arguably free market system. 
But even though Albanian democracy has greatly improved since its inception in 1990, it still has 
major flaws.  In Albania, there is little experience with democratic culture and thus democracy in 
Albania struggles today. As Figure 2 shows, Albania is categorized as a hybrid regime that is 
only partly free. Its main governmental deficiencies are in rule of law and corruption, including 
major organized crime such as human trafficking. The judiciary lacks independence and is prone 
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to manipulation by the executive branch and political parties.
Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores, since 2000 Albania has 
of democratization while worsening 
democracy today struggles. Albania has lower scores on the above indicators when compared 
with other Eastern European countries. 
 
Figure 3: Perception of CSO Impact
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The perceived impact of civil society
Albanians surveyed feel that CSOs make a relevant contribution to political and social changes.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the general Albanian population is more skeptical than CSO workers 
towards the positive impact of CSOs in political and social change. Vurmo says that Albanian 
civil society is “struggling to add value to national transformation efforts,” 
change. CSOs have likewise had mixed success in pushing government account
transparency. On the other hand, the area where civil society has the made most impact is in 
social and human rights, a key element in democracy and in global citizenship. In fact, 
associations have worked to develop a family code, laws on dome
equality - many of these issues are also priorities of global citizenship. Yet, despite the high 
number of organizations working with human rights, there have been little results in social issues 
like domestic violence and nondisc
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where civil society has had weak impact in helping to democratize Albania and inculcate global 
citizenship values include civic engagement, democratic governance, and rule of law.
Figure 4:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Shortcomings of Civil Society: Communist Legacy in 
 
 Lack of Democratic and Global Citizenship Values and Skills
The above weaknesses in civil society 
democracy are best explained by the cultural legacy of Albania’s dictatorship. Perhaps 
Communism’s most detrimental legacy to democracy is a political culture almost opposite that of 
a democratic one with an active citizenry in national and international issues. Albanians very 
much supported the decision to switch to democracy, but Albanian society and leadership did not 
have the tools, knowledge, and political culture to realize democracy effectively. So democracy 
promotion mainly came from the outside, especially Westerners working in Albania.
Albanians, and even elites, did not know what their human, social, economic, and political rights 
were. Democratic concepts and processes like 
transparency, and compromise in
government functioned in violation of them. Albanians also had very little experience with 
global citizenship ideals such as human rights and environmental s
being closed off from such ideas 
authoritarian experience stands in contrast to Kaltsounis’s
Global Citizenship Education, which both aim to train citizens with values of peace, dialog, 
human rights, and awareness of global issues. 
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Moreover, Albanians’ concept of the “common good” during communism differs greatly 
from the democratic meaning of this term. As Kaltsounis writes, in a democratic society, people 
work together to deliberate and determine the “common good” through a consensus of what is 
best for society regarding freedom and human rights. Likewise, the “common good” in global 
citizenship represents the well-being of the planet and of members in different societies, in 
alignment with international human rights and development frameworks. Meanwhile, the 
Albanian Labor Party defined the “common good” in terms of the masses working for the 
Communist Party, whose members obtained great wealth while the common people experienced 
poverty.80 The education system pre-1990 propagated the Communist definition of the common 
good. More than any other European country, Communist Albania was “fundamentally 
committed, nationally and internationally, to a hard “Marxist-Leninist” policy.” 81 It mimicked 
oppressive and even dehumanizing values and methods of Stalin, which inevitably contradict a 
free democracy that respects human rights.  
The communist regime left a value legacy that makes democratization very difficult for 
civil society today. As Feilcke-Tiemann writes, communism placed Albania in extreme isolation 
with no experience with democracy.82 Most Albanian adults today have little experience with 
democratic and global citizenry norms and skills, having grown up for most of their lives in an 
isolationist system that abused or negated democratic values and freedoms. The political culture 
during communism perpetuated a mentality of stereotypes, simplification, and dichotomous 
thinking, especially about other peoples and cultures.83 Thus critical thinking of Albanians and 
analysis of social and political issues is not very rich. Albanians were politically socialized by 
the Communist Party into a culture of separateness, authoritarianism, unquestionable obedience, 
fear, and distrust. People still are not skilled at deliberating and respectfully challenging other 
ideas because during autocracy, such independent thinking and expression was prohibited. 
People sacrificed democratic ideas of fairness, trust, and decency to survive under the 
government’s iron fist.84 Albania’s new “hybrid regime,” has the formal characteristics of 
democracy, but it lacks liberal standards and still functions using old communist mentalities.85 
But, Mungiu-Pippidi makes clear that no Eastern European state can have true democratization 
without “decommunization,” as the legacies of communism are powerful and harmful to 
democracy.86  
The political elite governing the country today were educated and socialized under the 
rule of the Communist or Labor Party 87, and thus they demonstrate similar mindset and habits as 
during the old regime, which is unhealthy for a democracy.88 Even though political parties 
wanted to destroy communist remnants in the system, they were not trained for such a regime 
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overhaul, as they were all educated under communism.89 The new political parties following the 
fall of communism were made up of former communists.  Politicians, governmental leaders, and 
Albanians grew up in a society with no democratic political culture so what occurs in the 
Albanian public sphere is “elite reproduction, not elite replacement.” 90 For this reason, many 
Albanians today believe that democracy, and a will for national and global engagement will 
develop in Albania when the current generation of political and civil society leaders leaves and a 
new generation of Albanians enters; new leaders who are better experienced with Western 
democratic political culture.91 Others look to the diaspora from Western states to return and bring 
democratic values and skills to the country.92 Trained internationally in societies where global 
citizenship ideals have already taken root, this diaspora may present hope in diffusing democratic 
and global responsibility into Albanian citizens.  
The lack of democratic values inherited from a period of autocracy cripples CSOs today. 
As these democratic values parallel those of global citizenship, their absence in Albania also 
negatively impacts the development of global citizenry there. Vurmo notes that civil society in 
Albania is not always run using clear standards for ethics and transparency, two essential pillars 
of democratic values.93 The CIVICUS 2010 report echoes this concern and adds that CSOs in 
Albania lag in transparency, accountability, and democratic decision-making to set example for 
democratic governance. Similarly, these are all elements that were absent during communist rule 
in Albania. 38 percent of CSOs leaders surveyed believe that the third sector experiences 
corruption.94 Over 50 percent of them think that civil society does not have enough transparency. 
Out of people who were surveyed from outside of the CSOs, 56.25 percent said that “most CSOs 
lack transparency.” 95 For example, low transparency in CSOs is evident because many are hard 
to reach by e-mail and reluctant to share information about finances and evaluations. Even 
USAID has said that civil society organizations in Albania need to communicate their activities 
to the public more effectively.96 The fact that CSOs continue to work in somewhat undemocratic 
manners and adhere to practices from the old regime make it slower for democratic change to 
take place.  
 
 
Trust Deficit  
 One of the main legacies of the Communist regime that has hindering the 
democratization process via civil society in Albania is a lack of trust and community within the 
Albanian population. During Communism, the state pitted citizens, neighbors, and friends 
against one another and against foreigners through forcing complicity for survival. In Albania, a 
quarter of citizens worked for the secret police to report treason against neighbors.97 98 Strangers 
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were not to be trusted, for anyone could be working for the government. Even near the end of 
Communism, people from other cou
accusing the Albanian of being in complicity with foreigners. The resulting low sense of 
community among Albanians renders Albanians less likely to identify with a broader 
international community towards common goals. In Albania, there also exists a low level of 
confidence in political and social institutions. 
to analyze political events and government 
came about from living under a secret
actions and where people speculated to try to understand 
still present today in Albania.  
There is an overall lack of trust in CSOs, political institutions, political parties, 
parliament, and politicians.100 On a survey about trust among 28 Eastern and Central European 
countries, Albania ranked lowest; 
politicians than Albanians are Greeks and Croatians.
Albanians said that one must be very careful in dealing with people and only 7.5 percent say that 
people can be trusted.102  Again, t
where the Communist Party governed arbitrarily
secret police.  
 
Figure 5: Summary of Trust and group Membership in the West and Former Communist States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a consequence of this lack of trust and social capital, most Albanians today want to 
engage in neither national nor international politics, thus reflecting Newton and Putnam’s belief 
that deteriorated trust harms the development of civ
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authoritarian times organizations like these were used to coerce loyalty to the Communist 
Party.103 As Figure 5 shows, lack of trust directly correlates with lower participation in CSOs. 
Citizens of Eastern European countries which have the least amount of trust because of their 
experience with communism, also show the least amount of involvement in CSOs.  
Volunteer CSOs face impediments in their present work to democratize Albania because 
Albanians may associate them with negative connotations of institutionalized “volunteer” work 
that was forced upon them under communism.104 However, democratic and global advocacy is 
dependent upon volunteer engagement. Meanwhile, the totalitarian system, volunteerism and 
civil society had no true definition because the government combined public and private spheres; 
civil society was not truly independent of the state. Today, Albanians distrust political parties 
and labor unions the most, as these had historically represented the Communist Party.  Likewise 
organizations of international scope did not exist because they were forbidden, so Albanians had 
little experience with the world beyond their borders. Albanians trust religious, humanitarian, 
and women’s organizations slightly more. The institutions that Albanians trust most are 
international and supranational governance bodies like the EU, UN, and NATO, which are not 
part of Albanian civil society.105 This trend shows that Albanians actually trust other countries 
and international institutions more than their own government and organizations. Yet, it does not 
mean, that a strong sense of global citizenship exists within Albania, as international institutions 
of global governance work mainly with the Albanian government rather than with the Albanian 
people through a bottom-up approach. They do not directly mobilize the Albanian population for 
involvement in national democratization or international issues.   
 
 
Antipolitics Discourse 
There exists in Albania an “antipolitics discourse” that has brewed since the failures of 
the previous and current governments to represent the people. In an ideal democracy described 
by Locke and Tocqueville, citizens should have faith in their institutions and be engaged in the 
political and civil processes. Today, such trust in institutions should also mean that citizens can 
use their government for advocacy regarding global issues of concern. Contrastingly, in Albania 
politics and CSOs analyzing national and global politics have become segregated from daily life 
and the masses. Politics and advocacy, whether national or international, are a separate sphere of 
activity for politicians, intellectuals, and analysts who function as translators of politics because 
the people are no longer presumed to understand politics on their own. Albanians today tend to 
stay away from politics and collective action in a phenomenon in which politics has become the 
“other” against “the people.” 106  
Moreover, public opinion of Albanians towards politics and civic engagement is 
negative. Because of their history with communism, Albanians today have a “kind of politics-
phobia,” 107 and they see politics as an evil in itself and corrupt by nature.108 Just as there existed 
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a gap between the majority of the population and the few elite leaders of the Communist Party, 
the same phenomenon of people separated from politics exists today. As the Communist Party 
and today’s political parties did not represent Albanians, people have turned against the parties 
and politicians. About 70 percent of Albanians in 2003 thought that political parties either do not 
serve the public interest, or serve it very little, staying consistent with the low public approval 
ratings.109  
Another part of the reason why politics are viewed in such a negative light in Albanian 
society is that political parties unsuccessfully tried to represent the people as masses against 
communism. After the fall of communism, parties claimed to represent “the people” under a fake 
democratic ideal and protect them from external threat, usually communism. This approach put 
all individuals of different classes and needs into the same category of “the people,” ignoring 
diverse existing socioeconomic, religious, and gender groups. Ironically, this is exactly how 
communism qualified and defined the population by failing to recognize and work with different 
groups. Such a generalized treatment of the entire population contradicts a democracy and the 
spirit of internationalism, where all different groups are to be acknowledged and play a viable 
part in their own governance (plurality or group theory). Throughout the 1990s, the Democratic 
Party engaged in an anticommunist discourse to distract the population from lack of economic 
development and infighting.110 The Democratic Party’s concept of “the people” against 
communism meant to bring together (against the previous dictatorship) groups that may have 
otherwise been in opposition with one another or with the government.. The anticommunist 
discourse also aimed to distract the population from an unaccountable government, troubling 
economy, and the daily problems that the people faced, such as poverty and violence. 
Counteractively, this negative campaign and hysteria further polarized people from the public 
sphere and fueled Albanians’ contempt for government and organizations. It created an adverse 
outlook towards government and efforts to bolster the new democracy.  
 
 
Low Civic Engagement, Apathy 
During the communist regime, Albanians developed passive and neutral attitudes towards 
public and civic engagement, which carry on to today’s emerging democracy. Figure 4 points out 
that today, the lowest score of Albanian civil society is in civic engagement. Many Albanians 
have “high level indifference” and “widespread apathy” when it comes to taking action in the 
public sphere.111 There is no strong philanthropic, volunteer, or international advocacy culture 
because people distrust or are apathetic towards NGOs. Consequently, Albanians are less willing 
to support NGOs.112  
Apathy resulting from the communist regime is largely responsible for the low level of 
civic engagement. The Communist Party forced people to mobilize in support of the party, using 
top-down institutions. This coercion resulted in a lack of desire and even fear of involving 
oneself in the government’s “civil society” and volunteerism. By the time of Hoxha’s death in 
1985, the Albanian population had become “largely dispirited and apathetic.”113 The majority of 
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Albanians’ attitude of passivity partly formed as a result of the government making almost all 
decisions for them, including career and housing for families. It may have also been a defense 
mechanism against arbitrary threats from the government. Meanwhile, the absence of freedom to 
choose and associate freely contributed to a general sense of hopelessness and futility. During 
the communist period, rather than working with the governmental system to reform it, citizens 
withdrew into private networks  of families, the aspect of life which was least touched by the 
state. Private networks, like family relationships, became more trusted than democratic voluntary 
networks.114 To this day, Albanians closely trust private relations with family (including 
extended family) and friends, but tend to avoid the public sphere of Albanian and international 
civil society and politics. Yet, passivity (or hostility) towards the public sphere is detrimental to 
an emerging democracy, which requires that people voice their opinions and be actively involved 
in shaping policies that affect them. It is not conducive to global citizenship because 
international advocacy relies upon people’s awareness and active engagement in local, national, 
and international events and issues.  
The low level of civic engagement in Albania is also due to the Albanians’ unfamiliarity 
the third sector because such a concept was part of the public sphere of the government during 
communism. When NGOs first began moving to Albania or opening up there immediately after 
the fall of communism, Albanians did not understand their role, nor did they trust them, let alone 
desire to become involved. Many Albanians also worry about transparency and donor agenda of 
CSOs. 
Civil society’s largest deficiency in Albania is civic engagement. Today only 18 percent 
of Albanians say they are active members of social or voluntary organizations, while about 28 
percent participate in individual activism (like signing petitions or demonstrating).115 Citizens 
feel that the only way to have a say in the government is by voting. Some Albanians fail to 
recognize the value in action beyond voting, such as by joining volunteer organizations or 
advocating for a cause. On their part, Albanian and international CSOs have not worked to 
mobilized the Albanian population in volunteerism and politics. Similarly, the intellectual elites 
have not been involved in leading civil society and bringing it to the mass population.116 CSOs 
have made little effort to try to engage citizens in their projects or to develop an active citizenry. 
Reporters and scholars like Xhindi and Kaltsounis make the case that NGOs need to raise more 
awareness about the significance and benefits of civic engagement, because there is not enough 
outreach and communication to invite citizens to participate in civic life. There is a gap between 
CSOs and the masses; there exists little interchange, dialogue, and knowledge exchange between 
the two.117 118  
 
Acceptance of Authoritarian Governance 
A dangerous legacy of communism in Albania is a political culture that is accepting of an 
authoritarian system of governance. As Mungiu-Pippidi says “Albania has still the strongest 
former Communists, and therefore the greatest contestation, which shows in the fact that 
Albanians, unlike in the other countries, still identify political conflict as the number one source 
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of social conflict.”119 Since its inception through the Constitution, the new government gave the 
executive branch in Albania’s new democracy too much influence over the other branches, even 
though the new government was supposed to be a parliamentary republic.120 The strength of the 
political party and executive branch leaves little independence to courts and police officers, 
which makes for a difficult atmosphere for pro-democracy reformers.121 Party and government 
leadership continues to be authoritarian through hierarchies that discourage or sometimes 
threaten dissention. Hoxha purged many members and top officials within the Communist Party 
and administration because he saw them as threats. In the same manner, political parties in 
Albania post-1992 eliminated dissidents within their own party and opponents from the 
competing parties. In fact, the Democratic Party used the 1995 law on "On Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity Committed in Albania during the Communist Regime for Political, 
Ideological and Religious Motives" opportunely to silence opposition rather than for post-
transitional justice.122 
 Although the Albanian government today does not use force as it did during the 
totalitarian period, it still constitutes an acceptance of violence in maintaining control. Albanian 
political culture among government leaders and the population to some extent condones 
authoritarian practices As Fischer writes, “some aspects of its [Albania’s] authoritarian rule live 
on: the elite’s general disregard for the well-being of the people and for the best interests of the 
state, brutal and intolerant politics, and the lack of a rule of law.”123 To illustrate, politicians, 
legislators, and senior officials often have their own bodyguards who fire and hire customs 
officers and other officials. Politicians use coercion and blackmail to meet their goals.124 While 
Albanians now have civil rights, the practice of torture persists. The current authoritarian 
governance style in Albania is an inheritance of the Communist regime, and therefore the 
process of “decommunization,” which Mungiu-Pippidi explains, has not succeeded in Albania. 
The use of force and authoritarian methods to maintain power is counterproductive to a 
democracy and global dialog, which require discourse instead of force, and plurality of voices 
instead of silencing of voices.   
Moreover, manipulation of elections by political parties show an adherence to old 
political values and is another detriment to democracy left over by the old regime. The Socialist 
and Democratic parties intimidated the judiciary and media, contested election results, and 
thwarted government operations if they were denied power. The willingness to succumb to 
almost any means in order to win elections comes from the previous government, in which loss 
of political power was disastrous. It is difficult for Albanian politicians to adjust to a democratic 
sharing of power with minority parties and accept electoral loss and succession after living for in 
a regime that annihilated opponents through mass purges by the secret police. 
In general, rule of law, a prime component of democracy, is weak and corruption high 
(more so than in the other western Balkan countries). This presents major challenges to civil 
society in its efforts to press for democratization. During communism, the undisputed law was 
what the Communist Party dictated. Likewise, today the state is identified with the party in 
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power instead of the rule of the Constitut
Baltaci and Zenelaj indicate, “what remained most alarming were Berisha’s inclinations to 
change the rules of the political game when they did not suit him.”
disputed leaders of state, uneven distribution of public goods, state capture, public procurement
and condoning of organized crime
system that thrived on such tactics. Today a lack of respect for rule of law
crime of human trafficking and drug trade. C
for CSOs to operate in. Weak rule of law undermines democracy and contradict
citizenship. The enormous challenge
greatly impede civil society’s work today.
very difficult for civil society to tackle them
and justice system.  
Figure 6: Albania Democracy and Civil Society Scores
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 of the Freedom House chart illustrates several points already made about the 
weak level of democracy and civil society. It confirms 
democratic governance, media independence, and strength of civil society.
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score between 1 to 7 appears, the lower the level of Albania’s democratic progress is. From 2003 
to 2012, most of the democracy indicator scores for Albania increased or remained the same, 
revealing less progress with each year. 
Like in the Albanian government, CSOs sometime also feature a top-down hierarchy in 
administration with strong power concentrated at the top. In the CIVICUS Report, 48 percent of 
CSOs made decisions through appointed leaders, or an appointed board rather than 
democratically through elected leaders, staff, and members.131 Hirst argues that civil society 
organizations contain an authoritarian hierarchical structure that limit freedom and give power to 
the few elites who control the organization.132 This is the case with many NGOs in Albania. 
The authoritarian and hierarchical nature of institutions involved in the public sphere is 
also present in the highly centralized education system. The way that decisions in university 
departments are taken is not typically democratic. Few educators participate in the deliberation 
of curricula, whereas a few leaders make the majority of the decisions about curricula with the 
input of the state. This decision-making process allows little chance for interaction and dialogue, 
going directly against decentralization and de-politization in the education system, which are 
important for democratic and global citizenship education. In the past, government’s say in the 
curriculum interfered with deliberation and did not allow civil society actors adequate freedom in 
designing curricula.133  
 
 
VII. Shortcomings in Civil Society: External Environment  
The external environment in which civil society operates can hinder civil society 
initiatives in democratizing Albania’s government. External environment refers to the political, 
social, economic, and cultural setting where CSOs operate and where civic engagement takes 
place. In 2013, Albania scored 55 on the Enabling Environment Index134, and ranked 52 out of 
109 countries. The only Eastern European countries ranking below Albania were Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo.135 Reports like the CIVICUS assessment of civil society in Albania say that the 
Albanian third sector functions in a “generally enabling environment,” but that CSOs do not 
consult regularly with the people or government in policy. In addition, there is a gap between 
CSOs and the masses because little interchange, dialogue, and knowledge exchange takes place 
between CSOs and the rest of Albanians.136 Gjipali comments, “Albania’s civil society sector 
remains weak and struggles to find space for meaningful activity in a highly politicized 
environment.”137 
Looking at the political environment, the government in Albania harbors distrust towards 
civil society. Like new Eastern European democracies, Albania’s government faces the difficulty 
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of encouraging civil society without allowing it to challenge the legitimacy of new 
democratically elected institutions.138 The Albanian government is still weary of bringing civil 
society into governance, such as in global issues of concern like environmentalism, for fear of 
opposition. Historically, the Communist state banned independent civil society because of the 
threat it would present to the state’s power. As Kuti writes, “governments did not trust 
[associations] at all, the most dictatorial ones even tried to completely eradicate them.139 Like 
during communism, today those who want to change the system are intimidated and kept out of 
influence by the state while anti-corruption rules become empty.140 The government still 
intimidates journalists and free press. While there is much more freedom in civil society today 
than during the Communist regime, present government distrust of civil society partly originate 
from the negative interaction between the two in the past. The government sees civil society as a 
check, or rather a threat, to its power. 
 
 
Legal Framework and Relations with the State 
The relationship between civil society and government continues to have tension through 
the legal framework of civil society, that is, the registration procedures for CSOs, taxation 
treatment, and pathways for CSO input in governance. Albania lacks clear and formal 
developed pathways for the involvement of civil society with Parliament, like via 
consultation.141 In fact, few NGOs work routinely with government to prepare laws; as 
mentioned, there does exist a partnership between government and civil society, but it is small 
even with municipal governments, let alone national government of issues of global 
importance. In cases where CSOs do provide input in legislation the state is not always 
receptive to it.142 Seventy-five percent of CSOs in Albania reported that they did in fact push 
for policy change in the last year, but only 38 percent of them said that they were successful. 
This indicates that there must be barriers to advocacy.143 Laws governing CSOs often impede 
civil society in post-communist countries. Even where laws allow for the protection of 
Albanian and international CSOs, the rules are not always enforced. Some Albanian civil 
society leaders and heads of CSOs experience unfair treatment and even harassment from the 
state.144 Thirty-nine percent of surveyed CSO leaders believed that the legal framework is 
restricting for CSOs and 28 percent of leaders reported that they experienced illegitimate 
restrictions from their local or central government.145 In this sense, government directly 
obstructs the work and project of NGOs and their leaders. Overall 56 percent of CSOs judge 
the interaction between civil society and state to be limited.146 
Another problem to civil society impacting democracy in Albania is that after 2005 some 
civil society leaders leave the third sector to work in government. Some civic activists believe 
that they can only make an impact by working in government, and in 2011 many ran for 
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office.147 The loss of civil society leadership to the state weakens and contributes to the 
deficiency in human resources of CSOs. As a result, some NGOs no longer continue 
functioning or many lose donor funding. Counterintuitively, the move of CSO leaders to the 
public sector is not conductive to democracy because there is no spillover effect to the 
government from former CSO leaders who have been trained using democratic values. Their 
democratic training and values corresponding with those of global civil society do not “take 
root” in the transitioning democracy through their new work in the public sphere.148 On the 
contrary, CSO workers who enter into the government environment begin to play by the rules 
of politics,149 which reverses the NGO teachings in democratic and global citizenship. These 
blurred lines between the public and third sector create even more distrust of CSOs in the eyes 
of Albanians,150 who view this phenomenon as collusion between the two.  
Next, the lack of financial viability of CSOs also leaves them open to manipulation by 
political parties.151 Some think tanks focusing on democracy and international affairs affiliated 
themselves with political parties post-1997, thus no longer produced authentic research.152 
Independence is especially an issue with media where there exists a triangle between the media, 
parties, and business. Newspapers often align along political party lines. Deviation or attack of 
major parties can lead to physical assault or shut down of a media outlet. Investigative 
reporting like “naming and shaming” is relatively new in Albania, although certainly 
increasing.153  
 
 
Sustainability: Civil Society as Driven by Outside Donors 
Civil society has been inefficient in spurring democracy in Albania because it is not 
entirely a grass-roots initiative like the volunteer associations that Tocqueville observed in the 
US, or like the advocacy of global citizens. Since the Albanian population is hesitant to work 
with civil society associations due to its troubling experience with communism, foreigners have 
mainly promoted civil society development within Albania. International agencies and a few 
Albanian elites impose certain goals, approaches, and projects instead of gathering information 
and input from the people about which goals and approaches are most important for them. On 
their part, Albanians do not articulate their issues or agendas to CSOs due to a lack of 
engagement and trust towards CSOs, as already discussed.  A top-down approach by CSO cannot 
substitute grassroots-led action that a democracy and global citizenship require to tackle issues 
important to the public. These movements must be led through ground initiatives from people 
educated in social, economic, and political issues of their community and abroad. Current 
bottom-up initiatives are not widespread and strong enough to support democracy and an 
emerging global citizenship in Albania.   
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 Another main environment reason for
democratization is that CSOs in Albania are, for the most part, not financially sustainable.
CSOs in Albania do not have a great amount of financial capacity. 
had the worst economic breakdowns, and today it continues to struggle economically as one of 
the poorest European countries. Albania’s economic problems discourage an already poor 
population from providing CSOs routinely with adequate funds and donations. Few Albanians 
donate time, money, and work to CSOs because they lack wealth or do not want to associate with 
the public sphere. Today this cripples the financial viability and human resources of CSOs in 
Albania. Organizations cannot carry out democratization and other projects re
transnational issues of concern if they are financially unstable and
donors.155 Figure 6 points out that
depend on short term grants even though 
allow for the success of long-term projects
projects in civil society.156 In fact, outside donors have failed to provide an adequate exit 
strategy, so many Albanian CSOs were not able to adapt to the donor withdrawal after 2000.
Figure 6: Evaluation of CSOs in former communist countries/ region
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, donors drive Albanian CSOs to compete with one another for funding.
environment forces CSOs to allocating resources to this competition rather than understanding 
social issues, defining problems, coming up with solutions, and forming partnership.
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of environment is detrimental to a healthy civil society that in theory depends on collaboration to 
bring about democracy and fight for global causes. The communist legacy has left behind an 
economic and legal environment not hospitable for civil society, therefore CSOs in Albania 
struggle to exist and make an impact today.  
  The unsustainability of Albanian CSOs in democratization projects can be summed up 
by their overall lack of capacity (see Figure 6) due to a weak enabling environment. Again, 
CSOs often are missing adequate human and financial resources because Albanians do not often 
volunteer, engage in, or donate to CSOs. The low political, legal, and financial support from 
government exacerbates the lack of capacity that CSOs face. The move from CSO leaders to 
government likewise decreases the human capacity. Root causes in political culture for these 
phenomena have been discussed. 
 
 
No Reconciliation with the Communist Past  
 Lastly, failure in reconciliation with its Communist past has impeded Albanian 
democracy and civil society’s impact in democratization. Post-communist transitional justice 
failed in Albania because of a lack of political will on the part of Albanian politicians to punish 
perpetrators of human rights.158 The state did not address gross human rights violations or bring 
to trial perpetrators who had committed crimes against the people during the authoritarian 
regime. Nor did it keep the participants of abuses during the communist regime  from further 
pursuing their careers through new political positions. In Albania, politicians who had been 
active during the communist period, like Sali Berisha, took charge of new political parties after 
the transition to democracy. In fact, the Socialist party was originally an offshoot of the past 
Communist Party. As noted, when the new democracy attempted post-transitional justice in 1995 
through the “Genocide Law,” it hijacked the post-transitional justice process to persecute 
political opponents. Today there is no reconciliation between former communists and former 
victims. People who were imprisoned wrongly as victims of the regime now struggle to cope 
psychologically with their experiences and receive promised monetary compensation by the 
government for their imprisonment.159 160 Moreover, there are no truth commissions in Albania 
to openly discuss and share the past government’s wrongdoings with the public.161  The absence 
of resolution through post-transitional justice “ultimately led to loss of trust from the general 
public failing to detach the Albanian political scene from its communist past.”162 This failure in 
reconciliation and justice denied victim closure. It set up a negative environment upon which to 
build democracy and move forward into global integration.   
 Another example of Albanian society refusing to reconcile with its past is the case of the 
secret service files which remain closed to the public. This clear lack of transparency endangers 
open democracy by perpetuating the culture of distrust in Albania. Only few government 
officials have opened and used some of the secret files, usually to attack opponents.163 However, 
many people doubt that the files are still authentic because it is most likely that the Communist 
party destroyed the files that would cause it harm and kept the ones that portray it more 
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favorably. Albanians have little enthusiasm for opening the files, mostly because some view it as 
futile, and others do not want to revisit old pains.164 165 Few fervent Albanian intellectuals and 
civil society actors, like literature author Ismail Kadare, call for making public the secret service 
files. But this does not appear to be on the political or civil society agenda.  
Civil society is also not doing its job of providing support in acknowledging and 
addressing the country’s dark history. Civil society is not facilitating a public discourse on 
totalitarian ideas, decommunization,166 and a “culture of remembrance.”167 Instead there is a 
culture of amnesia because most Albanians prefer to forget and move on from a sensitive and 
dark past. This hinders Albania’s transition to democracy and participation in a global civil 
society because the country has not acknowledged honestly the effects of communism in order to 
determine how it will move forward. Civil society organizations like think tanks, NGOs, and 
education centers are not focusing on resolving conflicts between the old communist structure 
and the new “democratic/ market paradigm” that Albania is attempting to adapt.168 Hence, 
Albania continues to show many traces from the totalitarian system despite technically having 
democratic institutions in place and a spot in world affairs. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion
 
 According to mainstream political theorists, there exists an inherent relationship between 
civil society and democracy.  Civil society is said to lead to democracy, while democracy is 
dependent on civil society. Moreover, the values of democracy, civil society, and global 
citizenship overlap, as a citizenry with democratic ideals often also contributes actively beyond 
the national layer to a global civil society. However Albanian civil society faces a major unique 
obstacle: the exceptional legacy of its past government, as Albania has one of most repressed 
histories under Hoxha’s communism. Now one of the “third wave democracies,” Albania is 
altering its political structures to meet the international standards for good governance and rule 
of law. Albania, which was arguably the most suppressive Eastern European totalitarian state, 
has made progress towards an open democracy, considering the short time period. After 1990, 
Albanian civil society grew from being almost nonexistent to filling in areas where the 
government was deficient in, such as social protection. Civil society’s main job now is to 
facilitate Albania’s democratization, to support the new democracy, and to engage in issues of 
global concern such as human rights and environmental sustainability. CSOs have begun to do 
this through training, advocacy for rule of law, and anti-corruption campaigns.  
Yet Albanian civil society faces difficulties in its tasks because it functions in a country 
and society where the communist legacy is all too prominent. Albanian politics and civil society 
internally reflect aspects of the past communist rule. They harbor values and skills that are not 
well-suited for democracy or global citizenship (like a deficiency in civic engagement and 
advocacy) because the public sphere leaders today were educated and trained in the political 
culture of the authoritarian period. Albanians have little trust towards their government and civil 
society. As a result of oppression under the Communist Party, Albanians engage less in the 
public sphere whether for domestic or international matters. They maintain negative opinions 
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towards politics and to some extent civil society itself. Furthermore, government, political 
parties, and civil society institutions seem to use authoritarian-like forms of ruling and decision- 
making, which are counteractive to an open democratic society.  
Next, civil society has not been very successful in bringing about democratization 
because the external environment in which it works holds on to some detrimental influences 
from the previous regime. There is still tension between government and civil society, as the 
government fears opposition from civil society actors, just as it did during the dictatorship. The 
lack of advocacy and financial support from Albanian society and government has kept civil 
society relatively weak, and global citizenship rudimentary in Albania. Consequently, foreign 
donors have promoted civil society most, but have made CSOs financially unsustainable and top-
down in the process. Albanian CSOs lack financial and human capacity largely because they do 
not operate in an encouraging, enabling environment. 
Lastly, Albania’s moving forward with democratization and international causes is 
hindered by the fact that the country and people have not reconciled with their own dark history 
through adequate post-transitional justice. Addressing these internal and external factors of civil 
society and its environment gives insight into why civil society struggles to lead Albania toward 
democracy today. With these root issues being laid out and examined, Albania has the potential 
to move forward and become a democracy that is led by an active citizenry in national and world 
affairs. 
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